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Abstract
Autonomous collaborative networks of devices are emerg-
ing in numerous domains, such as self-driving cars, smart
factories and critical infrastructure, generally referred to as
IoT. Their autonomy and self-organization makes them es-
pecially vulnerable to attacks. Thus, such networks need a
dependable mechanism to detect and identify attackers and
enable appropriate reactions. However, current mechanisms
to identify adversaries either require a trusted central entity
or scale poorly.
In this paper, we present SADAN, the first scheme to effi-
ciently identify malicious devices within large networks of
collaborating entities. SADAN is designed to function in truly
autonomous environments, i.e., without a central trusted en-
tity. Our scheme combines random elections with strong but
potentially expensive integrity validation schemes providing
a highly scalable solution supporting very large networks
with tens of thousands of devices. SADAN is designed as a
flexible scheme with interchangeable components, making
it adaptable to a wide range of scenarios and use cases. We
implemented an instance of SADAN for an automotive use
case and simulated it on large-scale networks. Our results
show that SADAN scales very efficiently for large networks,
and thus enables novel use cases in such environments. Fur-
ther, we provide an extensive evaluation of key parameters
allowing to adapt SADAN to many scenarios.
1 Introduction
The relentless trend towards network-connection of appli-
ances and devices in all spheres of our lives allows systems
to collaborate, becoming more efficient and enabling com-
pletely new use cases; this is often referred to as the Internet
of Things (IoT). In particular, the increase in connectivity of
devices that can affect the physical world brings new oppor-
tunities and, at the same time, many new risks. While many
scenarios are seemingly uncritical, like smart home, other do-
mains are obviously highly critical. The automotive industry
and associated industries, strive to increase safety through
connection and collaboration, e.g., cars sharing information
about potential hazards [53]. There are current developments
to standardize vehicle communications, such as the cellular
network based C-V2X [3] and the wifi extension standard
802.11p [48], which Volkswagen announced to support in
all 2020 Golf 8 [87]. In these high-stake scenarios malicious
devices can cause tremendous damage and even jeopardize
human life.
Many proposed security solutions rely on a central author-
ity, constituting a single point of failure. (1) The availability
of the authority must be guaranteed at all times, i.e., the entire
system must have continuous and reliable connectivity to it.
This is hard to guarantee in many practical systems, e.g., with
freely moving nodes. (2) A central authority is an attractive
attack target, exposing it to a wide range of attacks. Any suc-
cessful attack will corrupt its integrity and/or availability, i.e.,
make the central authority fail. There are many real world
examples how centralization of authority can be detrimental,
like the compromised DigiNotar PKI issuing fraudulent cer-
tificates for Google, Microsoft and CIA websites [93] or the
attack on Ukraine’s power grid by compromising centrally
operated Industrial Control Systems [99] or the DDoS attack
on DYN DNS bringing down major websites (incl. PayPal,
CNN and Amazon) in parts of Europe and the US [94]. These
examples show that even the most sophisticated defense mech-
anisms aiming to protect central services can be circumvented.
Further, when multiple (mutually distrusting) stakeholders are
involved, it is difficult to jointly agree on a party that acts as
the trusted authority. For instance, different car manufacturers
or cellular network equipment providers, which in many cases
do not inherently trust each other, will not easily agree on an
overarching authority with the power to control all devices.
Problem. In order to achieve the desired improvements that
the increased connectivity promises, the connected devices
need to collaborate and share information in a broadly au-
tonomous fashion. However, interdependencies within the
network increase the threat malicious devices pose to the
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entire system. In particular, a single malicious device could
cause other devices to deviate from the correct behavior; e.g.,
influencing the routing of other cars by transmitting false traf-
fic information [86]. Hence, such large networks must identify
faulty or malicious entities in order to react to attacks and
prevent a partial compromise of the network from impairing
the correct function of the overall system.
Increasingly, network-connected devices, including modern
vehicles [24, 61, 72], industrial facilities [20, 26, 36], critical
infrastructure [35, 54, 80], and even medical devices [81] are
targeted by (remote) software attacks [23,25,29,37,44,82,85].
Existing defense strategies. Traditional security solu-
tions [4, 15, 27, 28, 43, 55, 64, 66, 77, 79, 98] typically can-
not recover an attacked device, i.e., it usually crashes with
potentially catastrophic consequences.
Attack detection methods can uncover ongoing attacks,
enabling more sophisticated reaction policies, like recovery
of a compromised device [69]. Approaches like Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) [45, 67, 83, 88] or outlier detection
as used in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) [16, 101] suffer
from inaccuracies and rely on assumptions about the attack.
However, to be able to detect sophisticated attacks like code-
reuse attacks [23, 25, 29, 37, 44, 82, 85], powerful security
services, like remote control-flow attestation, are required [5,
6].
To be able to leverage powerful integrity validation
schemes, like remote attestation, in large networks of col-
laborating devices a number of challenges have to be tackled.
Enabling the overall system to tolerate and handle compro-
mised devices, a dependable global view or consensus among
all devices in the system must be found. This means all de-
vices in the network must be informed about the state of
the other devices. The simplest approach to achieve this is
all-to-all attestation; however, this approach does not scale for
large systems. Approaches to attest multiple devices collec-
tively, also known as swarm attestation, provide an integrity
proof of the network to a single verifier [7, 14, 21, 46], render-
ing them inapplicable in autonomous systems without central
authority.
For an autonomous decentralized system to detect, iden-
tify and react to attacks, all attestations would need to be
distributed and verified across the entire network. While con-
sensus protocols, e.g., Byzantine fault tolerance [22], in gen-
eral enable such agreement they are only applicable to (very)
small systems. Even the most efficient consensus protocols
do not scale to systems with thousands or millions of devices.
Goals and Contributions. To overcome the limitations of
existing defense approaches we developed a novel scheme
to identify compromised members within a network, called
Scalable Adversary Detection in Autonomous Networks
(SADAN). To achieve this, the devices in the network mon-
itor one another; however, no single device in the network
is trusted to decide whether or not another device is compro-
mised. In fact, if a single device could denounce another de-
vice as compromised this could be easily used by an attacker-
controlled device to destabilize the entire network by falsely
accusing benign devices. We are the first to combine ran-
dom elections with Byzantine fault tolerant consensus to effi-
ciently and conclusively determine in a highly scalable man-
ner whether an accused device is compromised, or if a device
is making false accusations. This allows the system to quickly
identify compromised devices and react, e.g., by excluding
the compromised device from the network.
Contributions. Our main contributions include:
• We present SADAN, the first efficient and dependable
scheme to identify malicious devices within very large
networks of collaborating entities without a central au-
thority. SADAN is:
– The first to combine random election, Byzantine
fault tolerant consensus and attestation to allow a
partially compromised system to detect and iden-
tify its compromised parts (Section 4).
– A flexible scheme with pluggable components that
supports various integrity validation schemes (e.g.,
different attestation schemes), random election
schemes as well as different consensus schemes
(Section 5).
• We implemented a highly efficient instantiation of
SADAN based on Proof-of-Elapsed-Time [1], Practi-
cal Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [22] and run-time
attestation [6] (Section 6).
• We evaluate SADAN’s security and we determine the
best choice for key parameters (Section 7). Further, we
developed a large-scale network simulation for SADAN
with tens of thousands of devices and demonstrate its
scalability through extensive evaluation (Section 8).
2 Background
In this section we provide background on the core mecha-
nisms used in our solution.
2.1 Remote Attestation
Remote attestation is a security primitive that enables a remote
party—called verifier—to validate the state of a device–called
prover. Remote attestation is typically realized as a challenge-
response protocol allowing a verifier to obtain a fresh and
authentic report about the prover’s software or hardware state.
Early remote attestation approaches were limited to the static
software state of a device, i.e., a cryptographic hash calcu-
lated over the binary code loaded into memory [34, 39, 84].
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This allows the verifier to detect modifications of a device’s
software binaries, e.g., due to malware infection. More so-
phisticated approaches capture the run-time behavior of the
prover’s device [5,6,10,30,31,100], which allows the verifier
to detect code-reuse attacks like Return-Oriented Program-
ming (ROP) [18, 23, 29, 37, 82] and even non-control data
attacks [25, 44].
In order for an attestation to be unforgeable by the adver-
sary, the prover is typically assumed to have a trust anchor
that is trusted by the verifier. A prominent instantiation of
a trust anchor is the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [96],
which is a dedicated hardware-secured microprocessor de-
signed for remote attestation [95]. The TPM can securely
store the computer’s state to be reported as well as crypto-
graphic keys necessary to authenticate the remote attestation
report. Remote attestation functionality can also be provided
by a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) [17, 57, 91]. A
TEE is an isolated execution environment that provides se-
curity features such as isolated execution, integrity of appli-
cations running in the TEE and confidentiality. Examples of
commonly available TEE implementations are ARM Trust-
Zone [11] for ARM-based platforms and SGX [9,49,70] from
Intel.
2.2 Byzantine Fault Tolerance
Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) algorithms solve the Byzan-
tine Generals Problem [65] of finding consensus among par-
ties where some might be faulty or adversarial, i.e., act Byzan-
tine. Many BFT works consider the use case of a distributed
system where nodes are connected via a network. Nodes col-
lectively perform operations in response to requests sent by
external clients. There are two important properties for every
BFT algorithm. (1) safety: requires that all operations are
executed identically—i.e., identical requests in an identical
order—from the perspective of all nodes [62]. (2) liveness:
requires that every request will eventually complete [22]. So-
lutions fulfilling only one of these two properties are trivial;
however, to achieve BFT both need to be considered, requiring
at least 3 f +1 total nodes to endure f Byzantine nodes [65].
PBFT. The first practical solution, guaranteeing both safety
and liveness, was introduced with the Practical Byzantine
Fault Tolerance (PBFT) algorithm [22]. PBFT is the de-facto
baseline in the BFT literature, and has been modified and
extended in various ways [32, 62, 68].
PBFT handles the ordering, which is important for BFT,
by selecting a so-called primary among all nodes, chosen
in round-robin fashion, which decides on the order of all
requests. If the other nodes notice that the primary acts slowly
or inconsistently, a “view-change” is executed, replacing the
Byzantine primary with another node. In normal operation
PBFT requires two rounds of all-to-all broadcasts, implying
a message complexity of O(n2), which limits scalability.
3 System Model
We consider large distributed autonomous systems formed
of networks of connected devices. These devices collaborate
with one another to perform complex tasks. For instance, au-
tonomous cars that exchange information with other cars and
traffic facilities can achieve safer and more efficient mobility.
In order to collaborate by coordinating their actions, the indi-
vidual entities of the overall system need to exchange infor-
mation, such as status updates and sensor readings. However,
such exchanged information is often critical for the correct
behavior of the overall system. In autonomous traffic, for ex-
ample, cars report their position and trajectories to each other
to predict (and avoid) collisions, and false information can
have catastrophic consequences.
We consider systems were all devices can—directly or
indirectly—communicate with each other, even in the pres-
ence of malicious nodes within the network. This can be
realized through various network technologies, e.g., meshed
networks with robust routing [42, 71], or upcoming technolo-
gies like 5G [2] and satellite-based networks [75, 90] where
malicious network-clients have very limited means to disturb
the network communication of other nodes1.
All devices are mutually distrusting and there is no trusted
central verifier or external coordinating operator on which the
network can rely. While, SADAN generally does not require
any security framework or security hardware, we present an
instance that utilizes Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs)
for random election and sophisticated integrity validation in
Section 6.
3.1 Adversary Model
We assume an adversary who has compromised a subset of
devices in the system and is able to coordinate them. The
size of the adversarial subset our scheme can endure is ad-
justable based on different parameters, which can be chosen
accordingly for the corresponding scenario. We describe and
extensively evaluate these parameters in Section 7.2. Com-
promising new devices takes non-negligible time for the ad-
versary2. We assume that the adversary cannot compromise
additional devices while the network performs a round of
SADAN. The adversary’s goal is to influence the collabo-
ration between honest nodes by manipulating the data sent
to other devices. We further assume that the adversary can
eavesdrop and manipulate messages between devices. How-
ever, the adversary can control only a subset of all network
links. We consider full adversarial control over the network
out of scope, as this would allow the adversary to bring down
1The adversary is limited to disturbing the communication of nodes
(with other nodes, base-stations or satellites) within physical proximity via
jamming.
2Assuming basic security like memory layout randomization, exploiting
devices requires many attempts [15, 28, 43, 55, 77, 79, 98]. In heterogeneous
networks the adversary needs to develop new exploits to compromise devices.
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Figure 1: An exemplary round of SADAN with one adversary (red) and three jurors (green).
the entire system independent of SADAN. Nevertheless, com-
munication problems constitute faults which are inherently
tolerated by SADAN. Furthermore, devices that participate
in denial-of-service (DoS) attacks are considered malicious
in our system3.
We inherit the security guarantees and assumptions of the
components used by SADAN. For instance, when using re-
mote attestation as the integrity validation scheme their as-
sumptions also apply to SADAN, i.e., the trust anchor is se-
cure and physical attacks are out of scope. Similarly, SADAN
inherits the detection capabilities of the used components,
for instance, depending on the integrity validation scheme,
different types of software attacks can be detected, including
code injection [38], code-reuse attacks [18, 23, 29, 82] or non-
control data attacks [25, 44]. We discuss several variants in
Section 5.1.
3.2 Requirements
A scalable and flexible adversary detection scheme for col-
laborative autonomous networks shall fulfill the following
properties:
• Adversary Detection and Identification: An adversary
actively trying to manipulate the scheme shall not go
unnoticed and shall be identified.
• Efficiency: The scheme is significantly more efficient
than verifying each device-to-device pair individually.
• Scalability: The scheme scales well to large number of
devices. The computational effort and communication
complexity grows sub-linear with respect to the number
of devices.
3As a result those devices will be handled by the recovery mechanism,
e.g., by expelling them.
• Interchangeable Components: The scheme’s individual
components have clearly separated roles and objectives,
making them easily replaceable, i.e., pluggable.
4 SADAN Design
Scalable Adversary Detection in Autonomous Networks
(SADAN) provides a scalable solution to deal with adver-
saries in truly autonomous networks, i.e., without external
supervision from a central entity. It works in three steps:
(1) A node announces a potential adversarial node,
(2) the potential malicious node is then verified by a ran-
domly elected jury acting on behalf of the whole network
(3) to agree on whether or not the suspected node is mali-
cious representatively for the whole network4.
Figure 1 shows an example and illustrates the high-level work-
ing of SADAN. The network consists of many devices, the
first five are denoted N1, ..., N5, the rest of the network is con-
densed for brevity. First, N2 notices some suspicious behavior
of the adversary N1. N2 will then announce N1 as suspicious
to the whole network. Next, the network randomly elects, in
this case three, jury members N3,N4,N5. The elected jurors
then individually validate N1 to verify the claim of N2 and find
a consensus about the integrity of N1 as well as the decision
how the network shall react. Finally, the jury decision is an-
nounced to the whole network. This example solely illustrates
one round of SADAN, i.e., one processed suspicion.
We introduce the concept of blame. In SADAN all nodes
individually look for suspicious behavior of potential adver-
saries, suspiciously acting node are then examined thoroughly.
We achieve this by giving each node the ability to blame an-
other node, i.e., announcing to the whole network that the
4The jury can also decide the action to take on the malicious node.
4
other node acts suspiciously and may be adversarial. This
way, we do not verify the whole network.
Once a node is blamed, the network has to reach a decision
about it. In a naive solution, each node in the network would
need to individually verify the blamed node, potentially in-
ducing a significant overhead on the whole network. Further,
for a sustainable autonomous network it is important to have
a consistent view across the network. Thus, a form of consen-
sus is needed. However, consensus protocols do not scale, as
explained in Section 2.2.
To avoid these scalability issues, SADAN randomly elects
a jury that representatively makes a decision for the whole net-
work. While this improves scalability, it comes at the expense
of the safety property. As the election of the jury is random,
there is a chance that enough adversaries are elected that they
can enforce an adversarial decision within the jury. However,
we can adjust the consensus so that it stalls rather than fails,
as stalling can be rectified by a re-election. In Section 7.2
we will analyze how these probabilities behave regarding
SADAN’s configurable parameters. We will show that these
parameters can be chosen, so that the probability of electing
an adversarial jury are negligible.
SADAN is designed to be modular, hence, individual com-
ponents have to be selected. Selecting these interchangeable
components depends on the targeted use case and its require-
ments. However, each component has requirements indepen-
dent of use cases that we will discuss in the following. In
Section 5 will thoroughly discuss possible instances for each
component and we describe a concrete instantiation in Sec-
tion 6.
Integrity Validation Scheme. Both for noticing the initial
suspicious behavior of a potential adversary and the subse-
quent validation by the jurors, an integrity validation scheme
is required. Such a scheme shall fulfill the following require-
ments:
• Correctness: The scheme correctly conveys evidence
representing the state of the prover to the verifier, even
if the prover device is under the control of the adversary.
• Freshness: The result of an individual validation shall
only be legitimate for the respective request, e.g., past
results shall not allow an adversary to illegitimately pass
subsequent validations.
• Immediate: The scheme shall work directly between two
devices without the need for any third party.
• Lightweight: The scheme shall be executable between
devices with limited computational resources.
Furthermore, it is also possible to use two distinct valida-
tion schemes for different phases of SADAN. As shown in
Figure 1, there is the initial validation raising the suspicion,
which can be done with one scheme (e.g., a lightweight and
superficial scheme). Then the validation used by the jury can
be a different scheme (e.g., a thorough and complex scheme).
Random Jury Election. After a node was blamed, the net-
work has to randomly elect a jury. A scheme accomplishing
this has the following requirements:
• Verifiable: The randomness used in the scheme is verifi-
able by all nodes.
• Fairness: Every node has the same chance of winning
the election.
Consensus. After all jurors performed their individual in-
tegrity validation of the blamed node, they need a consensus
scheme to agree on the result and the reaction to it. The fol-
lowing requirements shall be met by such a scheme:
• Safety: Assuming an honest quorum, the consensus itself
ensures consistency, including the order of processed
blames across all honest nodes.
• Liveness: The scheme shall eventually make progress on
all blames.
Multi-Round SADAN. Multiple rounds are necessary to
identify nodes that try to exploit the SADAN protocol.
SADAN automatically triggers blames of nodes that abused
the protocol, e.g., by falsely blaming a benign node or dissent-
ing with the jury. Hence, misbehaving nodes that interfere
with SADAN are uncovered. More specifically, an adversarial
node may blame an honest node multiple times to increase
the chances of electing enough accomplices to successfully
seize the jury, or simply try to use the blaming mechanism
to overload the system with requests. Therefore, an unsuc-
cessful blame will lead to an automatic blame of the blamer
by the jury of the current round. Further, clear violations in
the underlying components may trigger automatic blames as
well. For example, when the validation process is determin-
istic, correct jurors can safely blame a juror that reaches a
different conclusion from the same data. These automatic
blaming approaches will prevent the adversarial nodes to turn
the chances in their favor over time, as attempts to manipulate
the protocol will in turn risk getting blamed themselves.
Additionally, efficiency of SADAN can be improved by
streamlining the election process itself over multiple rounds.
It may be beneficial to skip re-electing the jury in every round.
For example, it might suffice to do a re-election every ten
rounds and keep the same jury in between. However, the
consensus may fail, either due to too many conflicting nodes
in the jury or non-security issues, like connection problems.
In such a case, a re-election is triggered. This strategy reduces
the overall overhead for the random jury election over multiple
rounds, as we will show in Section 8.4.
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5 SADAN Design Space
In Section 4 we introduced the individual components of
SADAN and discussed their requirements. This section pro-
vides an overview of possible options for each of the compo-
nents (cf. requirement Interchangeable Components in Sec-
tion 3.2), including those we use for our instantiation (see
Section 6). We consider these options in the context of our
aimed at automotive use case and system model (see Sec-
tion 3); thus, we do not claim the following as complete.
5.1 Integrity Validation Scheme
Integrity validation of a device can be done in very different
ways, for instance, using dedicated validation functionality
like remote attestation, or inferring device integrity by indi-
rectly observing the device’s behavior.
5.1.1 Attestation
To validate the integrity of a device, remotely attesting its
software can provide strong security guarantees, as it en-
ables nodes to directly prove that their software is not al-
tered. Depending on the used attestation schemes, different
classes of software attacks can be detected. In this respect,
there are two possible attestation approaches, static attesta-
tion and dynamic/run-time attestation, as described in Sec-
tion 2.1. Static attestation is efficient and ensures the integrity
of the binary program5. However, it does not ensure integrity
of program execution, which can be compromised by run-
time attacks. Dynamic (run-time) attestation schemes, such
as control-flow attestation, ensures run-time integrity by at-
testing a device’s code execution paths [5, 6, 30, 31, 100].
Depending on the required security guarantees SADAN can
employ both static as well as dynamic attestation.
5.1.2 Sensor Data Outlier Detection
In Wireless Sensor Networks the prevalent method of vali-
dation is the unsupervised outlier detection on sensor data
[16,101]. Outliers are measurements that significantly deviate
from the normal pattern of sensed data. The source of these
outliers are either due to noise, unusual events or malicious
attacks [101]. Regardless of source, certain approaches can
be used to reliably detect them, such as statistical techniques,
classification algorithms or techniques designed for specific
types of sensor data [101].
5.1.3 Anomaly Detection
One way to detect adversarial behavior is anomaly detection
based on machine learning. With this approach a model is
trained reflecting the nominal operation in the network. If an
5Static attestation provides similar guarantees as secure boot [12]
adversary misbehaves it will produce outliers in this model,
which will be detected. This has been successfully applied to
TCP/IP traffic [89]. Here, the model is trained on the metadata
found in network frame headers, such as IP addresses, packet
sizes and session data. Another work combines this technique
with federated learning for IoT devices [74]. This shift from a
central entity handling the training to a distributed approach,
makes these systems applicable to non-centralized systems.
5.2 Random Jury Election
Schemes for secure random elections can be found in the
blockchain space. Many cryptocurrencies employ a scheme
based on the Proof-of-Work to randomly elect the proposer
for the next block [19, 58, 73]. Instead of determining a new
block proposer SADAN can use these schemes to elect its
jury. In these schemes the voting power is directly tied to
computing power to prevent Sybil attacks [33], i.e., a node
assuming multiple identities to unfairly increase its influence.
The security of these schemes is based on game-theoretical
arguments tied to incentives, i.e., an adversary will only at-
tack if the monetary investment is worth it. While requiring
inherent value limits the applicable use cases, the following
two schemes from the blockchain space are not directly tied
to incentives.
5.2.1 Algorand
In Algorand [41] a delegation group is randomly elected to
propose new blocks. Here, each node draws a number based
on the Verifiable Randomness Function (VRF). The lowest
numbers win the election, and thus the delegation group is
elected. The VRF works as a deterministic source of random-
ness and as such is publicly verifiable. Put simply, each node’s
individual random number is the hash of the concatenation
of its identity, i.e., its public key, and the last block’s hash.
This results in a random number that is verifiable by all par-
ticipants, as only public information is necessary to calculate
it. Algorand also needs to protect against Sybil attacks, as the
membership is open. Each node has stake, i.e., the amount of
money they own in the system, which is used to assign weight
to their random number. Thus, the more stake a node has, the
higher the chances to be elected and vice versa. However, if
all participants are known, the election itself can be executed
without Sybil attack resistance.
5.2.2 Proof-of-Elapsed-Time
An alternative approach is used by Intel’s Proof-of-Elapsed-
Time (PoET) [1] to elect block proposers. It leverages Trusted
Execution Environment (TEE)s and a registration process
based on linkable attestation, i.e., attestation directly tied to
a specific processor, to prevent Sybil attacks. PoET enforces
a waiting time based on the random number, effectively sim-
ulating a Proof-of-Work without the corresponding power
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consumption. For this feature the TEE is used as well, which
attests that the respective node has indeed waited for its as-
signed amount of time, i.e., generating a waiting certificate.
The waiting approach reduces message complexity. Instead of
having all nodes announce their respective number virtually
simultaneously, each node has to first wait for that amount
of time. This way, honest nodes with a comparatively high
number will also wait longer and may observe lower-valued
waiting certificates meanwhile. In this case, the node can
decide not to announce its own wait time, saving overhead
as only a minor part of the network needs to announce their
respective wait certificates.
5.2.3 Deterministic Random Jury
Another simplified approach is to use a single verifiable source
of randomness instead of many. Thus, the drawn number
elects the whole jury. This way, instead of having all nodes
announce their number individually, the whole network would
deterministically know who is part of the next jury. For ex-
ample, a counter of the SADAN round could be concatenated
with all of the identities of the previous jury and subsequently
hashed as the source of randomness. This assumes a known
list of participants and is prone to errors as it may be the case
that elected nodes are currently not available, e.g., crashed.
5.3 Consensus
5.3.1 Simple Majority
Keeping a consistent order of the jury decisions is crucial, as
multiple simultaneous blame requests may occur that depend
on each other. For example, one round may elect a juror that
is expelled in another. However, if we assume to elect a new
jury every round and every juror has a random number, we
can extract an inherent order of requests. On two conflicting
requests, there will be two separate elections with two sepa-
rate juries. In such a case, the juries decide which request is
executed first by comparing their election results. With the
order being ensured, a simple majority vote among the jury
suffices.
5.3.2 Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT)
BFT is used to find an ordered consensus among a group (see
Section 2.2). As BFT will ensure consistency regarding the
order of processed requests, an election of a new jury every
round is not necessary. This way, we can keep an elected jury
for a selectable time window. While this reduces the overhead
involved with the election over multiple rounds, it induces
overhead of BFT in every round.
Executing BFT with a random subset of the group is unique
compared to traditional schemes. It is usually assumed every
node participates in the agreement process; thus, if there are
more Byzantine nodes than the scheme can formally endure, it
is impossible for the process to succeed. However, in our case
every election will have a diverse agreement group and may
succeed where the previous jury failed. Therefore, a failed
BFT agreement does not prevent progress in SADAN, as the
failure to return a result can trigger a new election resulting in
a new jury that is likely to proceed. However, we consequently
need to consider an additional negative case that we label the
total fail case, in which more than two-thirds of the jury are
Byzantine, allowing for results that are incorrect. In such a
case, the adversarial jurors are able to collude and enforce a
malicious decision on the whole system. In Section 7.2 we
examine the probabilities of both negative events.
5.3.3 BFT with Enhancements
In Section 7.2 we show that with increasing jury size, the
probability to fail decreases significantly. However, a larger
jury also implies a larger overhead due to the O(n2) message
overhead of BFT. To counter this, different enhancements of
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) can be employed
to reduce complexity. For example, the speculative case [62],
skipping PBFT phases, or the optimistic case [32], halving
the consensus group. However, both reduce overhead only for
the benign case. Another approach is to involve a message
aggregation scheme [58] to significantly reduce message com-
plexity. Thus, if we expect Byzantine events to be rare, it may
be feasible to consider larger jury sizes with inherently better
security guarantees. If we have a trusted component available,
we can also employ a trusted monotonic counter, which re-
moves the need for BFT’s prepare phase entirely as well as
reducing the required quorum to half plus one nodes [68,97].
6 Our Instantiation of SADAN
In this section we spawn an instance of SADAN with specific
components. For this, we consider a smart traffic scenario [92]
where individual vehicles collaborate by sharing sensor data.
We specifically focus on GPS data, which is crucial for the ve-
hicles to exchange, e.g., to avoid collisions. We use SADAN
in this scenario to identify adversarial vehicles that send al-
tered GPS data and endanger other vehicles. The vehicles
themselves have numerous Electronic Control Units (ECUs),
which are responsible for providing sensor data. We use re-
mote attestation as the integrity validation scheme on the
responsible ECU, to ensure tamper-free GPS data. Typically,
the infotainment system is the most powerful computing de-
vice in the vehicle, but only responsible for uncritical tasks.
The infotainment system also provides the interface to the
outside world and acts as a proxy for the ECUs; they are con-
nected via an in-vehicle bus like CAN [51] or FlexRay [52].
Therefore, it is well suited to execute both our random election
scheme as well as the consensus protocol. We will expand on
the specific platform we used for our evaluation in Section 8.1.
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We chose components based on the analysis of options in
Section 5. In the following we will describe our rationale for
choosing the individual components and how they work in
our instance.
6.1 Device Run-time Attestation
For integrity validation in our SADAN instance we chose
Data Integrity Attestation (DIAT) [6], which targets trust-
worthy data exchange for collaborative autonomous vehicles.
DIAT provides strong security guarantees, as it can detect
static code modification as well as code-reuse attacks (in-
cluding some non-control data attacks [44]), while working
efficiently on embedded systems.
Within a vehicle, critical sensor data—in our scenario GPS
data—is processed by various software modules on an ECU.
To ensure that the GPS data has not been manipulated by com-
promised software on the ECU, DIAT tracks the execution
path of all software modules that access the GPS data. Hence,
any unintended modification of the GPS data is recorded and
included in an attestation report σ. DIAT employs a security
architecture, which can be software-based [56], hardware-
based [13] or hybrid [17], to isolate all software modules and
ensure the authenticity and integrity of the attestation report.
Before the GPS data leaves the ECU it is augmented with the
attestation report. The resulting message is integrity protected
and authenticated using digital signatures.
Other vehicles, that receive the GPS data, can use σ to vali-
date that all modules that did access the data only performed
benign manipulation to the data. If the validation of σ fails,
the receiver will announce the failed attestation to the net-
work, i.e., blame the sender. For this, the receiver constructs
a blame message mb, including the data it received, the as-
sociated attestation report σ and the identity of the sender
device.
6.2 Random Jury Election via PoET
We decided to use an approach based on Intel’s PoET [1]
for the random jury election. The scheme has two primary
advantages over its alternatives. First, the election mechanism
itself is not directly tied to any incentives. Second, the wait-
ing concept of PoET allows to significantly reduce message
complexity of the election.
While based on PoET we elect multiple jurors instead of
one. It works as follows for j jurors:
1. As soon as a node receives a blame message mb con-
taining the attestation report σ, it will generate a random
waiting time chosen from a exponential distribution and
wait for the generated amount of time. The waiting time
can be in the range between a chosen minimum tmin and
maximum tmax.
2. Each Node will receive waiting certificates from other
nodes and compile a Jury Election Leaderboard JEL, a
sorted list containing waiting certificates with the lowest
observed waiting times. When receiving a waiting certifi-
cate, the node will first check if the certificate has merit,
i.e., if the waiting time is lower than the largest entry
in JEL or if |JEL| < j. Nodes refrain from validating
and forwarding certificates if they do not have merit at
that time. Otherwise, the node will check the validity of
the certificate and add it at the corresponding position
in its JEL. If |JEL| > j, the last entry is removed so
|JEL|= j.
3. After a node is finished waiting, it will check if JEL
contains less than j waiting certificates from other nodes
or if its own waiting time is smaller than any of the
entries in JEL. If its own certificate has merit, it will
announce it to the network and add it to its JEL. If not,
it will discard its certificate.
4. After a node additionally waited for a pre-defined time
threshold tele, it will assume its JEL to be mostly com-
plete. If the node’s own certificate is still in JEL, it will
assume to be part of the jury. If so, it will start the agree-
ment process with the other jurors in JEL.
As long as the adversary cannot partition the network for
long periods, all nodes will converge towards an identical
Jury Election Leaderboard JEL consisting of the j waiting
certificates with the smallest waiting time (we elaborate more
in Section 7.1).
6.3 Byzantine Agreement
To find a consensus among the jurors about a blamed node, we
decided to use BFT. This eliminates the need to do an election
on every blame, significantly reducing the overhead of the
elections over multiple rounds. Especially if multiple adver-
saries are detected in quick succession, BFT can have a higher
throughput. However, we decided to implement PBFT [22],
and thus we refrained from implementing any BFT enhance-
ments. Other works in the BFT literature compare their per-
formance against PBFT, and thus it can be considered as the
baseline. We decided to use this baseline rather than introduc-
ing any further assumptions or performance considerations of
the alternatives.
Our scheme works as follows, using PBFT as a subprotocol:
1. After the election, the Jury Election Leaderboard JEL
has a sorted list of the j lowest wait times for each juror.
The juror with the lowest wait time will be the primary.
2. On conflicting blame requests and elections, the jury
containing the overall shortest waiting time is selected
for the next round. Thus, the initial round for a new jury
can skip the prepare phase entirely.
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3. If the primary acts unambiguously incorrectly, as well
as triggering a view-change, jurors will also blame the
primary.
4. After a successful prepare phase all jurors will proceed
to individually validate the attestation report σ included
in the agreed on blame message mb.
5. The jurors will execute the commit phase to agree on the
attestation result and the measures to be taken, i.e., the
jury decision (see Section 9).
6. The reply from each juror is broadcast to the entire net-
work, containing at least two thirds of all jurors’ signa-
tures. The rest of the network can consider each valid
and consistent decision message on the same blame to
be equivalent. This avoids separately spreading up to j
inconsequentially different decision messages.
As we execute the protocol only on a subset of nodes, the
protocol can fail due to safety or liveness. However, in our
application a safety violation is far more problematic than
a liveness violation, since a failure to reach consensus can
be rectified by requesting a new jury. We will discuss these
probabilities in Section 7.2.
6.4 Communication Aspects
Two communication aspects have implications on the perfor-
mance of our instance, and thus for the evaluation in Section 8.
As this is not a primary focus of this work, we discuss alter-
natives on these aspects briefly in Section 9. The first aspect
is the way how we broadcast messages. We implemented a
flooding based broadcasting protocol. Every node forwards
broadcast messages to all neighbors, except the one from
which the message was originally received. This way, a mes-
sage will take the optimal paths, and thus flooding is optimal
regarding run-time.
Further, to reduce message overhead in terms of actual
sent out bytes, we used a collective signature scheme. In the
consensus phase all jurors have to individually consent by
providing their own signatures. As we evaluate different jury
sizes, we decided to implement the Schnorr signature scheme.
This way, increasingly adding signatures to a message does
not result in increasingly bigger BFT messages.
7 Security Evaluation
In this section we evaluate SADAN’s security and analysis on
the probabilities of the random jury election to fail. We will
show how different parameters affect SADAN and provide
the foundation for selecting a feasible configuration.
7.1 Security Consideration
The adversary’s goal is to either evade being identified (de-
tected) by SADAN, or to misuse SADAN to manipulate the
overall system, e.g., by having benign devices considered ma-
licious by the system and sanctioned, or both simultaneously.
Subsequently, we will individually explain each goal and why
it cannot be achieved by the adversary.
Evade identification. To evade the identification of nodes
controlled by the adversary, the adversary can follow different
strategies: (1) try to prevent being detected initially, (2) pre-
vent being blamed, (3) prevent that an agreement is found
identifying the adversary-controlled node6.
Strategy 1: To avoid initial detection the adversary can
(a) stop interacting with the overall system and not participate
in the integrity validation, or (b) behave correctly according
to the used integrity validation scheme used. By not interact-
ing with the system the adversary isolates itself while at the
same time not answering to integrity validation request will
ultimately lead to the conclusion that a node is not behaving
correctly. However, given an appropriate integrity validation
scheme the adversary will only pass validation by behaving
correctly, in which case the system is not endangered by it.
Otherwise, (c) the adversary has to break the integrity valida-
tion scheme.
This means the adversary only succeeds when one of the
assumption of the integrity validation scheme are violated,
i.e., SADAN is secure with respect to the first attack strategy
as long as the assumptions of the used integrity validation
scheme hold.
Strategy 2: Once an adversary-controlled node has been
recognized by another node, this node will send out a blame
message to inform the network. To prevent this, the adver-
sary (a) can compromise the blamer node, (b) suppress the
communication from the blamer node, or (c) vilify the blamer
node.
The adversary would need to compromise the blamer before
it is able to send out the blame message, which we consider
out of scope (cf. Section 3.1). However, even if the adver-
sary manages to compromise the blamer node, this node will
eventually be verified itself and reported to be compromised.
In order to suppress the communication of the blamer node
the adversary needs to control all communication channels of
the blamer node7.
Lastly, the adversary might try to discredit the blamer so
other nodes will not believe the blame, i.e., the compromised
node will broadcast a blame message accusing the blamer
node. In this situation both nodes will be examined by a jury
uncovering the real adversary.
6The adversary can also try to prevent being sanctioned by the system,
however, the overall system’s reaction is not the focus of this work.
7According to our assumptions (cf. Section 3) the adversary cannot pre-
vent the broadcast of messages.
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Hence, the adversary only succeeds by preventing the
broadcast of blame messages, i.e., SADAN is secure against
the second attack strategy as long as the assumptions hold
that the adversary does not have complete control over the
network (cf. Section 3).
Strategy 3: Finally, the adversary can try to prevent that the
network finds agreement regarding the compromise of a node.
The adversary can (a) try to sabotage the election/forming of a
jury, (b) control sufficiently many members of the jury, (c) pre-
vent interaction between jury members, or (d) the proclama-
tion of the result to the network. Finally, (e) the adversary can
distort the random jury election process to cause inconsisten-
cies within the network that will affect the decision making
in the subsequent consensus phase.
To sabotage the jury election and forming, the adversary
needs to prevent communication in the network, which we
deem out of scope (cf. Section 3.1). The adversary could also
subvert the nodes to be part of the jury, e.g., to shut them off.
However, with high probability (cf. Section 7.2), some nodes
will be elected that are not compromised by the adversary.
In order to control a sufficiently large number of jury mem-
bers the adversary can either compromise the jury members
on-demand once they are elected. This however, requires the
adversary to be able to rapidly compromise many nodes of
the network, which contradicts our adversary model (cf. Sec-
tion 3.1). Otherwise, the adversary has to break the random
jury election scheme to reliably get nodes that are under its
control to be elected as jurors. Since the jury is randomly se-
lected there is a chance that the adversary-controlled nodes get
elected. As we show in the subsequent section (Section 7.2)
this chance is negligible with the right choice of parameters.
To prevent the benign jurors from finding an agreement
the adversary can disturb their communication, which again,
means that the adversary would need to control large parts of
the network, violating our networking assumptions.
Furthermore, the adversary could try to prevent the jury
from announcing the agreed-on result to the network, which
also means that the adversary needs to control the network
communication.
Finally, the adversary could try to manipulate the jury elec-
tion process in order to prevent devices in the network to learn
the correct list of jury members. As a consequence, these de-
vices would not accept the decision of the jury leading to
inconsistencies between different nodes of the network. How-
ever, this would require an adversary that can permanently
prevent the wait certificates by legitimate jury members from
arriving at selected devices. Given that the random jury elec-
tion scheme does provide the guarantee that the elected jury
is eventually known to the entire network, all devices will
eventually accept the decision made by the legitimate jurors
as soon as they learn the list of legitimate jurors and receive
the consistent decisions of a sufficient large number of those
jurors. Even if some devices do not learn the decision of the
jury, i.e., have differences in JEL due to waiting certificates
being withheld by the adversary, this will have the effect of
reducing the fault-tolerance of the Byzantine agreement to fol-
low, with ‘shortest j’ nodes missing from a node’s JEL being
replaced by other nodes from outside this set, essentially man-
ifesting as an additional fault. Thus, the security of SADAN
depends on the security provided by the used schemes.
Hence, in order for the adversary to succeed with strategy 3
it has to break one of the used schemes (random jury election,
integrity validation or consensus finding), has to control the
network communication of the entire (or at least large parts of
the) system, or be able to quickly compromise all jury mem-
bers. Each of these attacker capabilities violate our system
and adversary model.
Manipulate system. The adversary can also try to manipu-
late the system by misusing SADAN. In particular, by blam-
ing benign nodes the adversary can try to get them sanctioned,
e.g., excluded from the network to increase its own share of
the network. However, to achieve this the adversary either
has to alter the integrity validation report of a benign node to
convince the jury that the node is compromised. This means
the adversary has to break the integrity validation scheme,
in particular the authentication method used by (a) either ex-
tracting a secret from a shielded location or (b) by breaking a
cryptographic primitive like signatures.
Alternatively, the adversary can aim to gain control over
a decision making majority of the jury to come to a mali-
cious agreement that will be accepted by the entire network.
Here the same arguments hold as discussed above for strategy
3b and the probability of success by chance analyzed below
(Section 7.2).
In summary, the adversary can only misuse SADAN when
breaking one of the underlying schemes or with negligible
probability, and thus fulfills the requirement for Adversary
Detection and Identification (cf. Section 3.2).
7.2 Probabilistic Analysis
SADAN includes the random election of a jury of size j,
that has temporary authority to jointly make a decision over
a blamed node. The joint decision is based on a Byzantine
agreement, which means it fails if more than b( j− 1)/3c
jurors are adversarial [22]. As our scheme randomly elects
a small set of nodes as jurors, it may happen that enough
adversarial nodes are elected for the Byzantine agreement
to fail. This section discusses the probabilities regarding the
adversary share in the network as well as regarding the chosen
j. While a larger j reduces the chances of a failed election,
Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) also induces a message
complexity of O( j2). In Section 8.6 we will evaluate this
effect in our simulation.
If we have n total nodes in our system, with f of them being
adversaries and elect j jurors, the probability of electing at
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least b( j−1)/3c adversarial nodes is:
1−
( j
k+1
)( n− j
f−k−1
)(n
f
) 3F2[ 1, k+1− f , k+1− jk+2, n+ k+2− f − j ;1
]
(1)
Where k = b( j−1)/3c and pFq is the generalized hyperge-
ometric function. Equation (1) is the cumulative distribution
function of the hypergeometric distribution.
While this equation models the probability for the Byzan-
tine agreement to fail, we can rectify a liveness violation
by re-election, as described in Section 6.3. In some applica-
tions, it may make sense to accept reduced fault-tolerance
by increasing the message-count threshold used by PBFT
from b2( j−1)/3c+1 to some greater value q. Then, n−q≤
b( j−1)/3c faults are sufficient to cause a liveness violation,
but a safety violation requires a greater number 2q− n of
faults. If the protocol reaches an impasse, another consensus
round, including a new jury, is started that may succeed. This
can be modelled as a Markov chain: we begin in an initial
“undecided” state and transition to a “success” state if no
more than n−q adversarial nodes are elected—guaranteeing
agreement—and a “failure” state if at least 2q−n adversarial
nodes are elected—allowing a safety violation. The failure
state will eventually be reached with probability
P[Eventual Failure] =
P[F ≥ 2q−n]
P[F ≥ 2q− j]+P[F ≤ j−q] (2)
and it will take on average 1/P[ j−q < F < 2q− j] elections
to leave the “undecided” state.
Besides the threshold q, a primary factor affecting the prob-
ability of an eventual safety violation is the jury size j. The
more jurors are elected per round, the lower the probability
for the Byzantine agreement to fail. We illustrate the influence
of the jury size j and BFT threshold q in Figure 2. Increasing
the threshold q drastically reduces the probability of even-
tual failure; however, when the adversarial share is large, it
increases the number of consensus failures before agreement
is finally reached. The choice of jury size j and threshold q
is therefore application-dependent, depending upon the ap-
propriate trade-off between failure probability, time to reach
agreement, and performance. We evaluate the latter of these
considerations in Section 8.6.
8 Performance Evaluation
In this section we evaluate of our SADAN instance for the
smart traffic scenario (cf. Section 6). After we describe our
reference system we describe the setup for our large scale
simulation campaigns. The results of these campaigns will
be examined in the subsequent sections. We first analyze
the effects of differently chosen wait time parameters. These
parameters need to be chosen carefully to ensure the random
election is consistent. Afterwards, we examine the scalability
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Figure 2: The probability of eventual safety violation of
Byzantine agreement with a population size of 10000 given
a threshold of (a) q = b2( j− 1)/3c+ 1 and (b) q = b4( j−
1)/5c+1, as well as the mean number of juries needed before
agreement terminates, whether in success or total failure, for
q = b4( j− 1)/5c+ 1 in Figure (c). The distinctly colored
graphs depict the probability development for different jury
sizes j. Note that the case depicted in (a) will always either
terminate or suffer a safety violation with a single jury elec-
tion, unlike that in (b) and (c) where several juries may be
necessary.
of our SADAN instance for large networks regarding run-
time and messaging overhead, showing sub-linear run-time
growth in regards to network size. Finally, we show how this
performance is affected by choosing different jury sizes.
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Table 1: The measured run-times and message sizes of indi-
vidual processing steps
wait certificate
generation
attestation
generation
attestation
validation
BFT process +
Schnorr-sign
89 ms 835 ms 849 ms 1 – 4 ms
blame message waiting
certificate
decision
message
BFT message
4276 Bytes 192 Bytes 184 Bytes 188 Bytes
8.1 Reference System Measurements
As explained in Section 6 we use a vehicle’s infotainment
system as the central platform for SADAN. We also chose to
use the original Proof-of-Elapsed-Time (PoET) implementa-
tion. Intel indeed offers special processors for infotainment
systems in vehicles, namely the Intel Atom A3900 Series [50].
However, this line of processors is not openly purchasable.
Nevertheless, the Intel N5000 series is based on the same
architecture as the A3900, which we used as our reference
system. Therefore, this is representative in terms of process-
ing power found in a car. To evaluate the attestation scheme,
we rely on the performance measurements reported for Data
Integrity ATtestation (DIAT) [6], specifically the attestation
of the GPS module.
The top half of Table 1 shows our measurements regarding
run-time, while the attestation numbers are from DIAT [6].
The BFT and Schnorr signing is fluctuating depending on jury
size, so for the simulation, described in Section 8.2, we chose
to use the worst-case (5 ms). The bottom half of Table 1 shows
the sizes of the messages being sent out. The blame message
contains the attestation report, 4096 Bytes in size, as reported
in DIAT [6]. The wait certificate itself is 140 Bytes in size.
The BFT and decision messages also contain a 128 Bytes
long Schnorr signature. All message sizes contain 40 Bytes
of TCP and IP headers.
8.2 Simulation
To evaluate the performance of SADAN for large numbers
of devices, we used the OMNeT++ network simulator [76].
We implemented SADAN at the application layer and used
the measurements described in Section 8.1 to set the process-
ing times for the individual steps taken by each node. The
communication delay between any two devices was set to
5 ms. We argue this is reasonable, as 5 GHz Wi-Fi can already
provide this to date as well as the promises of the upcoming
5G cellular communication technology to be able to reach
latencies below 1 ms [40, 78].
The network is configured in a square mesh topology, with
roughly the same height and width. Every node has four links
to its neighbors, except the nodes at the edge of the network.
There is a simple on-demand routing algorithm in place, but
we consider the overhead for calculating routes out of scope,
therefore, it does not contribute to the run-time measurements.
We evaluate SADAN for different network sizes, from
1000 to 100000 nodes. We also split measurements into the
different phases. We simulate the first round of our SADAN
instance with the following phases8:
1. Initial Attestation: Generation of the initial attestation
report σ by the blamed node and the integrity validation
of σ by the blamer.
2. Blame: Broadcasting the initial blame message.
3. Election: The election process to elect j jurors.
4. BFT: The Byzantine Fault Tolerance scheme, including
the validation of σ by each juror.
5. Decision: Broadcasting the outcome of the BFT.
Notice that this represents the worst case, i.e., the upper
bound regarding run-time and message overhead, as it in-
cludes both the election and the complete BFT. Further, to
minimize variation of individual simulation runs, due to the
random nature of our scheme, we average every individual
parameter configuration over 30 runs with different random
numbers.
8.3 Election Wait Time
We evaluate the time parameters tmax and tele, as they con-
tribute significantly to the performance characteristics of
SADAN. tmax is the maximum wait time regarding the ran-
domly chosen wait time for each node. After a node is done
waiting, it will wait an additional time tele while collecting
other waiting numbers. Afterwards, it will assume the election
to be mostly complete, i.e., to have a mostly matching JEL. If
tele is chosen very small, the election itself will be faster; how-
ever, the individual JELs may also be still inconsistent among
the nodes. To measure this effect we executed a parameter
study for differently chosen time parameters with n = 2000,
j = 22 and tmin = 100ms.
Figure 3 shows the results. In (a) we can see the effect on
the execution time of one round. It is primarily tied to tele,
as can be seen if comparing different tmax that result in the
same tele. The graph (b) in turn shows how many unjustified
BFT messages were received. While a lower tele reduces the
execution time, it also increases the number of nodes falsely
assuming to be jurors.
Figure 3 (c) shows the average number of messages per
node for the election phase. This shows how many nodes
actively participate in the election, i.e., nodes assuming their
wait time still has merit after waiting for tele. However, (d)
shows how many jurors get to the point of sending out a deci-
sion. This measurement should ideally match the chosen j, so
22 in this case. Yet, it can be seen that if the time parameters
8Subsequent rounds will be faster, as no election is needed.
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Figure 3: (a) The time for one round, (b) the total number of
non-juror BFT messages, (c) the average number of election
messages per node and (d) the total number of reached deci-
sions, all for differently chosen tmax and tele. Simulated with
n = 2000, j = 22, tmin = 100ms.
are chosen too small, not the entire jury can reach a decision
or none at all, as the nodes’ JEL will diverge to the point
where no quorum can be established among the jury.
With these measurements in mind, we chose a time param-
eter configuration for our further evaluation, keeping the dis-
covered trade-offs in mind: tmax = 800ms and tele = 400ms
for n = 2000. We used a dynamically adjusted configuration
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Figure 4: (a) The completion time of each phase, (b) the
average number of messages sent per node and (c) the average
data sent per node, all split into the individual phases for
increasing n. Simulated with j = 22.
per network size, based on the worst route a message can take.
As we employ a square mesh network with a communica-
tion delay of 5 ms for one hop, we use tele =
√
n ·2 ·5ms and
tmax = tele ·2.
8.4 Per-Phase Performance for Large Net-
works
In this section we examine the Efficiency and Scalability of
SADAN, two main requirements (cf. Section 3.2). Figure 4
(a) shows the run-time measurements. Note that the measure-
ments per phase are denoted as the absolute simulation time
at the last processed message of the respective phase—phases
overlap as progress is made in parallel. The top purple line
represents the time of the last received decision message in
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Figure 5: The completion time of each phase on a malicious
blame. Simulated with j = 22
the network, and thus the total time for one entire SADAN
round. A network of n = 100000 takes 11.03s.
A naive and simplified solution to the problem would
be to let all devices attest every other device individually.
The time this case takes for n nodes can be expressed as
tatt_gen + tatt_val · (n−1). This does not take communication
delay into account and assumes perfect parallelization be-
tween the nodes. This naive case would take over 14 minutes
for n = 1000 and over 23 hours for n = 100000.
Figure 4 (a) also shows the individual measurements per
phase. The third line in green shows how long the election
takes. The time for the election overlaps with the blame broad-
cast, implying that the election requires the most time of the
scheme. The red line, second from the top, shows when the
BFT is finished. Figure 4 (b) and (c) show the message over-
head per phase both in terms of count and sent out bytes. Note
that we consider all messages for these measurements, i.e.,
including forwarded messages by nodes in between the route.
Both graphs reveal that the election phase (green bars second
from the left respectively) generates the most overhead both
in message count and size in bytes. The total message over-
head for n= 100000 is 305.69 messages (71.58 kB) per node.
However, assuming a subsequent round with a jury already in
place, the total message overhead without the election phase
is reduced to 9.84 messages (16.10 kB) per node. We also
simulated malicious blames in the same manner and evaluate
it subsequently.
8.5 Malicious Blame Evaluation
In this section we examine how a malicious, i.e., unjustified,
blame affects our simulation. In every round our blamer is
an adversary, and thus will be blamed itself when its original
blame turns out to be unjustified. For this, we extend the
definition of the individual phases defined in Section 8.2.
After the initial BFT phase, we additionally define:
1. BlamerAtt: The primary requesting an attestation report
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Figure 6: (a) The time for one round and (b) the average
number of BFT messages sent per node for different j.
from the blamer, generation of the blamer’s attestation
report σr and distribution of σr to the other jurors.
2. BlamerBFT: The second BFT round, including the vali-
dation of σr by each juror.
3. Decision: Broadcasting the outcome of the second BFT.
Figure 5 shows the runtime measurements. A network of
n = 100000 takes 18.62s for a malicious blame compared to
11.03s for a benign blame. Considering the first BFT round
takes around 4 seconds, the attestation report generation as
well as validation takes around 2 seconds and some routing
overhead, these results do not deviate from our expectations.
8.6 Jury Size
The following examines the effects of differently chosen jury
sizes j on our instance of SADAN. Figure 6 (a) shows the
run-time for one round. Even for large juries, like j = 100,
in a large network, like n = 100000, the difference on the
run-time compared to j = 10 is only 1.37s (or 13.1 %). This
is due to the individual BFT steps being able to execute in
parallel.
The second graph (b) show the average message count per
node of the BFT phase. The O(n2) message complexity for
two BFT phases are apparent. Nevertheless, the closest case
we could find to compare the election overhead against the
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BFT overhead is n = 1000 and j = 100. Here the average
message overhead per node for the election is 632.21 against
the 417.95 for the BFT message overhead. Thus, one BFT
round is more efficient than an election in overall terms. How-
ever, BFT also concentrates the overhead on the jurors and
the routes between them, compared to the more uniformly
distributed overhead by the election.
9 Discussion
This section discusses possible extensions to SADAN.
Broadcast. Our instance of SADAN uses Flooding for
broadcasting. However, in terms of message complexity a
Gossip protocol may be advantageous in many use cases.
Gossip protocols randomly send broadcast messages to a set
number of neighbors, which in turn do the same [63]. These
protocols are probabilistic in nature, yet, perform well on
average and significantly reduce overhead compared to flood-
ing [63].
Monitoring. An aspect that could be changed is the on-
demand nature of the integrity validation. For example, one
could have all nodes regularly check all their neighbors in-
stead. This way, after a set span every node would be validated,
so even a passive adversary cannot hide.
Dynamic Jury. Further, the jury size does not have to be
fixed over the life span of a SADAN instance. It might be
advantageous to dynamically adjust the jury size when re-
quired, e.g., increase the jury size when many blames occur
in a short time frame. This would dynamically adjust the
security probabilities along the network’s needs at the time.
Final Decision. Part of a practical instantiation of SADAN
is the resulting reaction of the jury to a confirmed adversarial
node. This by itself is a vastly complex topic and highly depen-
dent on the use case. Nevertheless, this section sketches some
possible approaches for practical implementation. Straight-
forward expulsion of the faulty node as a result of the jury
decision is not possible in many use cases, e.g. cyber-physical
systems like autonomous cars, where expulsion from the net-
work does not prevent them from affecting the system. In
these situations, some other response might be more appro-
priate. Many mechanisms exist for self-healing, in which a
faulty node is returned to a valid state. In this case, we might
choose to use SADAN not to exclude an adversarial node, but
to decide whether a node will be added to the network.
10 Related Work
Collective Attestation. The first step towards scalable at-
testation of large groups of interconnected devices, i.e., col-
lective attestation, was made by SEDA [14]. It proposes a
scheme that spans a tree over the network topology to en-
able efficient aggregation of static attestation reports. Built on
this approach, numerous enhancements have been proposed.
SANA [7] enables anyone to verify the attestation reports
while removing the need for trusted hardware for aggregation
of reports. In SEED [47], a non-interactive trigger for the
attestation is proposed based on a secure timer to prevent DoS
attacks. WISE [8] proposes to reduce overhead after the initial
complete attestation by attesting solely a subset of the net-
work. SALAD [60] aims at highly dynamic networks to work
under frequent network partitions. DARPA [46] additionally
mitigates physical attacks by introducing an unforgeable heart-
beat. It assumes that the physical attacker has to take devices
offline for a minimum amount of time. In SCAPI [59], this
approach is extended by regularly updating session keys.
However, all collective attestation protocols rely on a cen-
tral authority, the so-called verifier, which has to supervise
the attestation and needs to be trusted by the entire network.
Further, these approaches aim to verify the whole system at
once on request, whereas SADAN ensures security in a sus-
tainable way by giving all nodes a tool to continuously and
autonomously validate each other.
Anomaly Detection. Another approach to identify adver-
saries in a network is to detect abnormal behavior. In the field
of Wireless Sensor Networks this is achieved by recognizing
outliers in the aggregated sensor data of all sensors in the
network [16, 101]. Among others, one source of these out-
liers can be malicious attacks [101]. This, however, assumes
comparable data among the nodes.
Other works have focused on detecting anomalies in a sys-
tem via statistics, pattern recognition and machine learning.
This approach is thoroughly examined in the field of Intrusion
Detection Systems, which have gained much attention in re-
cent years [45,67,83,88]. However, these approaches assume
a central entity conducting the analysis. Further, they target
detection of specific attacks, such as a Botnet participating in
DDoS attacks.
Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) with random commit-
tee. Most notable in this domain is Algorand [41] and Byz-
coin [58]. They use a similar strategy to our work by selecting
a subset of nodes in the network as the consensus group.
This allows to use BFT in a scalable way to construct a cryp-
tocurrency. We already thoroughly examined Algorand in
Section 5.2.1. However, Algrorand builds on a adapted binary
consensus algorithm adapted to transaction block selection,
and thus specifically designed for cryptocurrencies. For select-
ing the consensus group Byzcoin requires to mine blocks via
Proof-of-Work (PoW). Then, a chosen number of the last suc-
cessful miners emerges as the group executing BFT. However,
this approach is not feasible for our purposes. For example,
in a heterogeneous network some less powerful nodes have a
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significant disadvantage in the election. Further, an adversary
can use a powerful external machine to exceed the processing
power of the entire network.
11 Conclusion
In this work, we presented SADAN, the first scheme to effi-
ciently identify adversaries in large networks consisting of
autonomous collaborating devices. SADAN combines ran-
dom elections, consensus and integrity validation methods
in a flexible scheme, where each of these components are
interchangeable. We have demonstrated the scalability of an
exemplary instance of SADAN as well as provided the basis
to construct use-case specific instances of SADAN. In future
work, we aim to improve SADAN’s flexibility (as outlined
in Section 9) and examine enhancements to tolerate network
partitions.
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